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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Many  families  fail to  vaccinate  their  children  despite  the  supply  of  these  services  at  no cost.  This  study
tests  whether  personal  reminders  can  increase  demand  for vaccination.  A ﬁeld  experiment  was  con-
ducted  in  rural  Guatemala  in  which  timely  reminders  were  provided  to  families  whose  children  were
due  for  a  vaccine.  The  six-month  intervention  increased  the probability  of  vaccination  completion  by
2.2  percentage  points  among  all children  in treatment  communities.  Moreover,  for children  in treatment
communities  who  were  due  to  receive  a vaccine,  and  whose  parents  were  expected  to  be reminded  about
that  due date,  the  probability  of  vaccination  completion  increased  by  4.6  percentage  points.  The cost  of
an  additional  child  with  complete  vaccination  due  to  the  intervention  is estimated  at about  $7.50.93
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. Introduction
Immunization is one of the most cost-effective strategies for
mproving child survival (Bloom et al., 2005). However, over 1.5
illion children die of vaccine-preventable diseases every year,
epresenting 29 percent of all child deaths under the age of ﬁve; the
ajority of these deaths occur among poor populations in develop-ng countries (World Health Organization, 2014). In recent decades,
ountries have implemented different supply-side interventions
o boost vaccination rates, including expanding access to health
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nformatics, participants in the American Medical Informatics Association’s 2011
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rom the Inter-American Development Bank and support from the Guatemalan Min-
stry of Health. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors
nd  do not necessarily reﬂect the views of the Inter-American Development Bank,
ts  Board of Directors, or the countries they represent.
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.0/).care facilities, implementing vaccination campaigns, and provid-
ing vaccines free of charge. These policies have surely contributed
to increased vaccination rates. Nonetheless, in 2013 about 21.8 mil-
lion children worldwide did not receive the recommended package
of vaccines (World Health Organization, 2014). Hence, in a context
of readily available supply, a critical question is how to further boost
demand for vaccines in developing countries.
The low demand for vaccines exempliﬁes a more general pattern
of limited demand for preventive health care in developing coun-
tries. This pattern seems paradoxical given evidence of substantial
expected future gains of implementing a variety of preventive
health care actions and the low cost associated with these actions
(Bloom et al., 2005; Bleakley, 2007; Lucas, 2010). This puzzle has
prompted substantial research aimed at understanding the under-
lying barriers that could explain such behavior. One potential
barrier relates to a lack of information regarding future beneﬁts
of preventive health measures. Indeed, a series of experiments
reviewed by Dupas (2011) shows that information campaigns can
increase demand for preventive health care, though these inter-
ventions are typically insufﬁcient to achieve universal adoption of
promoted behaviors.
Another potential explanation for low demand for preventive
health care is that individuals discount future beneﬁts heavily or
that they exhibit present-bias behavior. That is, individuals may
 under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/
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roperly value future gains of adopting certain healthy behavior
ut they may  not want to sacriﬁce current consumption (or time) to
chieve these gains. In the case of present-bias behavior, individu-
ls decide to postpone certain health actions until a future date, but
nce the day arrives, they decide to postpone the required invest-
ents again (Loewenstein, 1992)1. To tackle this barrier, incentives
an be introduced to provide individuals with present beneﬁts for
dopting certain behaviors. Consistent with this view, many coun-
ries have implemented conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs
n part to promote increased coverage of certain health services
ncluding vaccination. Evidence suggests that these programs have
ypically generated improvements in vaccination rates, although
he effects have been modest (Fiszbein et al., 2009). Moreover,
onditional cash transfer programs typically require large public
utlays. For example, a conditional cash transfer implemented in
icaragua between 2000 and 2002 provided beneﬁciary families
224 per year if health conditionalities were met  (Barham and
aluccio, 2009)2.
A third explanation for low demand for preventive health care in
eveloping countries is that sub-optimal decisions may  be traced
o reduced cognitive capacity produced by high levels of poverty
Mani et al., 2013). This line of research posits that individuals
iving in poverty must constantly manage limited resources and
ace difﬁcult trade-offs; these constant preoccupations leave fewer
ognitive resources available, which may, in turn, lead to poor
ecision-making. This approach suggests that certain simple public
nterventions, such as providing reminders, could be particularly
elpful for individuals living in poverty to make better health
ecisions.
Providing reminders to parents about the coming due date of a
accine for their children is a low-cost strategy that requires mini-
al  conditions to scale up. Producing these reminders only requires
nformation on the beneﬁciaries’ birth dates and some efﬁcient
ode of communication with parents (e.g., via community health
orkers)3. Moreover, reminders in health care have been shown to
e effective in developed countries and are routinely used in pri-
ate sector settings4. However, these reminders are rarely used in
eveloping countries and, more importantly, little is known about
heir effectiveness in increasing adoption of recommended health
ehaviors in these settings5.
1 It is generally accepted that people prefer receiving rewards in the short term
ather than in the future (DellaVigna, 2009; Loewenstein, 1992). Similarly, they
ould rather defer incurring costs. Exponential discounting could explain a par-
nt’s decision to put off vaccination if the expected costs of vaccination exceed the
xpected discounted beneﬁts. However, various studies show that people’s behavior
eveals hyperbolic discounting or preferences that weigh current well-being against
ny future moment, in excess of what would be expected with exponential discount-
ng (Thaler, 1991; Thaler and Loewenstein, 1992). Such preferences keep people
rom making certain investments that would yield future rewards.
2 Fernald et al. (2008) present evidence from Mexico’s CCT program. Banerjee et al.
2010) also ﬁnd that in-kind incentive payments – in the form of lentils or dishes –
ncreased vaccination rates in India. The authors note that the value of the incentive
as  very small in comparison to the estimated beneﬁts of receiving the vaccines,
uggesting that families are underestimating the value of the vaccinations or are
eavily inﬂuenced by the immediate costs and beneﬁts of obtaining vaccination.
his is consistent with observations about hyperbolic discounting, such as those by
’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) and Thaler (1991).
3 In contrast, although reminding beneﬁciaries of overdue vaccines could poten-
ially be more effective, it may  be infeasible in many developing countries. This is
ecause providing such reminders requires a well-functioning electronic medical
ecord system to identify children who have not received the expected vaccines
iven their age.
4 A comprehensive review of the U.S. literature found median effects of these
nterventions on vaccination rates of 8 percentage points for studies published
etween 1980 and 1997 (Briss et al., 2000). A more recent review also documented
ositive effects of reminders on vaccination rates (Jacobson Vann and Szilagyi, 2005).
5 One of the few studies on reminders in developing countries is the paper
y Wakadha et al. (2013) that present results of a small-scale intervention thatonomics 44 (2015) 226–237 227
This paper presents experimental evidence on whether
reminders can increase vaccination rates in developing coun-
tries. The intervention was  implemented in rural communities in
Guatemala. Through a program known as the Coverage Extension
Program (PEC for its Spanish acronym), the government hired non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) to provide a package of child
and maternal health preventive services in clinics which in turn
employ community health workers to promote attendance at the
clinics. We randomly assigned clinics in our sample to either a treat-
ment or a control group. In treatment communities, health workers
received lists of children who were due to receive a vaccine at the
clinic in the following month. The experiment took place in 2011
and 2012, and we assess the effects after six months of implemen-
tation.
Our main outcome of interest is an indicator variable for
whether the child has received all vaccines recommended for his or
her age (complete vaccination). As in other developing countries,
in Guatemala coverage rates for vaccines due in the ﬁrst months of
life are high, but they decrease markedly for vaccines due after chil-
dren turn one year old. That is, 86 percent of children 12 months
old or younger received all vaccines recommended for their age,
but this rate decreases to 67 percent for children between the ages
of 18 and 48 months and to 42 percent for children between the
ages of 48 and 53 months6. These patterns suggest that individu-
als recognize the value of vaccination and may  be willing to incur
the (time) costs involved in having their children vaccinated. This
interpretation is consistent with survey results from the study area:
100 percent of mothers agreed that vaccination improves children’s
health, and 98 percent believed that their children would receive
all recommended vaccines. Nonetheless, the decline in complete
vaccination rates with child age shows that most families fail to
follow through with their plans, suggesting that reminders may
aid families in achieving full vaccination7.
To measure the effects of the intervention on complete vacci-
nation, in the main analysis we  use administrative data from 130
clinics participating in the study; this corresponds roughly to 130
communities, although some clinics cover two communities. The
main sample includes about 13,000 children who  were one to ﬁve
years old at the end of the intervention. The NGOs collected and
maintained administrative data using the PEC’s data platform. The
data included a complete record of all health services provided to
children (including vaccination) and their dates of birth. Because
the NGOs conducted a census every year in the communities under
analysis and because community health workers are expected to
track births, deaths, and migration throughout the year, the records
were considered to have high coverage of children residing in the
area, according to public ofﬁcials and NGO managers. About 85 per-
cent of vaccination records coincide between the administrative
data and the information in the vaccination cards held by families
in these communities8. In addition to these administrative data,
combined text messages with monetary and in-kind incentives to increase vaccina-
tion rates in rural Kenya. The study documented the feasibility of the intervention
though effects were not ascertained because of the lack of a comparison group. Also,
Blaya et al. (2010) report that mobile phone-based reminder systems in South Africa
and  Malaysia were effective in improving compliance with treatment regimens and
attendance at appointments.
6 Overall, the fraction of children younger than ﬁve years of age with complete
vaccination was 67 percent.
7 Vaccines given at later ages may be more easily forgotten by families. While vac-
cines given in the ﬁrst year of life are administered relatively frequently (at birth, and
at  two, four, six, and 12 months of age), subsequent vaccines occur less frequently
(the  next vaccines are given at 18 and 48 months of age).
8 We used administrative data as the main data source to have a large sample
size and, hence, to be able to detect small effects. We  feel that detecting small
effects is important because, as this is a low-cost intervention, and small effects
could translate into large increases in vaccination rates per dollar spent.
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Table 1
Health and well-being in Guatemala.
National Rural Study sample
(%) (%) (%)
[1] [2] [3]
Poverty 54 70 68
Extreme poverty 13 21 18
Chronic malnutrition 43 52 45
Vaccination rates
Tuberculosis (birth) 96 96 97
Pentavalent 1 (2 months) 96 96 96
Polio 1 (2 months) 95 95 97
Pentavalent 2 (4 months) 92 91 94
Polio 2 (4 months) 88 88 95
Pentavalent 3 (6 months) 87 86 93
Polio 3 (6 months) 80 81 93
MMR  (1 year) 90 92 90
DPT booster 1 (18 months) 90 92 76
Polio booster 1 (18 months) 84 84 76
DPT booster 2 (48 months) 33 – 35
Polio booster 2 (48 months) 33 – 35
Complete vaccination (all ages) – – 67
Notes: Poverty and extreme poverty indicators are constructed for all individu-
als  using data from the 2011 Guatemalan Living Standards Measurement Surveys
(Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida, ENCOVI). Chronic malnutrition is computed for
children aged 3 to 59 months old using data from the 2009 ENSMI (Encuesta Nacional
de Salud Materno Infantil). For the study sample, these indicators are constructed
as  weighted averages using data from the departments of Sacatepéquez, Izabal
and  Chimaltenango (weights are based on the 2009 department level population
projections). Vaccination rates for columns 1 and 2 are computed using the 2011
Guatemalan Living Standards Measurement Survey (except from ﬁgures for DPT
booster 2 and Polio booster 2 that were obtained from the National Immunization28 M. Busso et al. / Journal of He
e surveyed 1200 households in our sample to collect information
n parents’ perspectives on vaccination, household characteristics,
nd access to and use of health services. Finally, we applied surveys
o community health workers before and after the intervention to
earn about how they structured their work and how the interven-
ion affected their work behavior.
We document that the treatment and control groups are similar
n their baseline characteristics. There is, however, some evidence
f imperfect compliance with treatment. In the treatment group, 64
ercent of community health workers reported receiving the new
atients’ lists. Similarly, there is some evidence of imperfect com-
liance in the control group as 14 percent of community health
orkers in this group reported receiving the new patients’ lists.
herefore, we present intent to treat (ITT) and local average treat-
ent effect (LATE) estimates. Results indicate that the intervention
ncreased complete vaccination by 2.2 percentage points (ITT) and
y 4.5 percentage points (LATE) for children in treatment com-
unities. However, not all children in the sample were due for a
accine during the intervention period. That is, for children older
han one year old, vaccines are due only at 18 and 48 months of age.
ence, the parents of a child aged 30 months at endline would not
ave been reminded of a vaccine during the six-month interven-
ion period. Consequently, we estimate effects on the subsample of
hildren due for a vaccine during the intervention and found that
he treatment effect for them increases to 4.6 percentage points
ITT) and by 9.1 percentage points (LATE).
The overall effects of providing reminders are remarkable taking
nto account the costs involved in this intervention. We  estimate
hat the total cost of scaling up this intervention in Guatemala is
nly $0.17 per child for the six-month intervention. Hence, the cost
er additional child with complete vaccination due to this interven-
ion is expected to be $7.50 using the ITT estimates9. These costs
er additional child vaccinated are much lower than those of typi-
al conditional cash transfer programs implemented in other Latin
merican countries. However, it is important to recognize that con-
itional cash transfers target multiple objectives including other
ealth behaviors, educational outcomes, and overall reductions in
overty10.
Our results contribute to the substantial literature that analyzes
he determinants of the demand for health care. More speciﬁcally,
t contributes to the strand of the literature that has analyzed how
ifferent factors affect the demand for immunization including,
or instance, perceived beneﬁts and costs (Mullahy, 1999; Sadique
t al., 2013), service price (Xie and Dow, 2005), beliefs and social
orms (Zimet et al., 2005), maternal education and household
ealth (Streatﬁeld et al., 1990; Xie and Dow, 2005; Bondy et al.,
009).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
escribes the setting in which the intervention took place. Section 3
escribes the intervention, the experiment, data sources and treat-
ent compliance. Section 4 presents the empirical strategy. Section
 presents the results. Section 6 concludes.. Setting
Guatemala is a lower–middle-income country with a per capita
DP of US$496111. Due to a highly skewed income distribution,
9 Using the larger IV estimates (LATE), the cost per additional child with complete
accination is about $3.70.
10 Information campaigns could also generate large effects given the costs
nvolved. However, they may  be better suited to promoting higher vaccination rates
verall than to increasing coverage of speciﬁc vaccines given later in life.
11 Data for 2010 in current purchasing power parity in U.S. dollars obtained from
he World Development Indicators.Program). Vaccination rates for column 3 are computed using administrative records
from the PEC from February 2012.
however, half of the population lives in poverty. The top panel in
Table 1 presents some indicators of well-being. Poverty is concen-
trated in rural areas, where 71 percent of the population is poor
and 52 percent of children under ﬁve suffer from chronic malnutri-
tion. This is the highest rate of chronic malnutrition in the Western
Hemisphere, similar to rates seen in sub-Saharan African countries
that are currently at an earlier stage of development. Note also that
the sample of communities and individuals included in our sample
has similar characteristics to those of the whole country.
Traditionally, Guatemala’s rural population has had limited
access to modern medical services. The government has tried to
reach these populations via the PEC, which was established in
the mid-1990s as a component of the Peace Accords that ended
Guatemala’s 36-year civil war. The program provides free basic
health care services to children under the age of ﬁve and women of
reproductive age, with a focus on preventive care. It was  designed
to expand health care coverage in rural underserved communities.
At the time of the study, the program covered approximately one
third of the population of Guatemala (Cristia et al., 2015). This pop-
ulation is widely dispersed, located in communities that are often
small and far removed from major cities and roads. A large propor-
tion of this population would have to travel by bus or on foot for
more than a day to reach the closest health care facility.
The Ministry of Health hires local NGOs to provide PEC services.
The NGOs operate a network of basic clinics, which often consist
of a simple stand-alone structure or even, at times, a room in a
community member’s house. All clinics in our study are part of the
PEC program. Services for children include routine vaccinations,
micronutrients, Vitamin A and iron supplements, growth moni-
toring until the age of two and treatment of acute diarrhea and
respiratory infections. For women  these clinics offer family plan-
ning, prenatal care (including tetanus vaccines, folic acid, and iron
supplements) and postpartum care. Curative care and sanitation
monitoring are also provided, but on a limited basis.
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on two  sheets of paper. The lists are distributed to community
health workers at monthly meetings at the NGO ofﬁces, along
with information on the medical team’s upcoming visit to their
For instance, children who received only one dose at 15 months or older are at ﬁve
times greater risk of developing measles compared with those who had two  doses.M. Busso et al. / Journal of He
Mobile medical teams visit each clinic once a month. Com-
unity health workers support the mobile medical teams by
onducting outreach in their communities, encouraging individ-
als to attend the clinic on the medical team’s visiting dates if they
eed services, and letting others know when it is unnecessary for
hem to come in12. The clinics in our sample cover between 10 and
40 children under the age of ﬁve, and an average of 117 children
er clinic. Health workers are expected to track individual families
o be able to inform them every month whether they should attend
he mobile medical team’s visit. To do this, some keep detailed
ecords of each person in their area, including what services they
ave received. Others workers simply make a general announce-
ent of the medical team’s visiting dates, without reaching out to
ndividual families. The approach taken therefore depends on the
ealth worker’s initiative.
Community health workers are paid a stipend that is below the
inimum wage. In interviews with these workers, it became clear
hat for some of them, being a health worker is a second job to which
hey devote little attention, while others view it as an important
eadership role in the community. In a baseline survey of commu-
ity health workers, 97 percent indicated that they provided some
ort of reminder of the medical team’s visit. However, only 78 per-
ent said they knew which individuals needed services, and only 50
ercent indicated that they planned ahead of time who  to remind
nd how to reach these people.
The PEC has an electronic medical record system in place. Mem-
ers of the mobile medical team record the services they provide
o each patient on paper-based patient charts, which are generally
ocated at the clinic. After the visit, the mobile medical team brings
ny updated charts to the NGO ofﬁce, where data entry assistants
pdate the medical record system. The mobile medical team then
eturns the paper charts to the clinic on their next visit. The data
oused in the medical record system are used to generate aggre-
ate statistics, such as the total number of children vaccinated, or
otal number of women who have received prenatal care. With few
xceptions, the data are not used at the local level to improve cov-
rage, or to support community health workers in their efforts to
rack individual families.
In addition to the PEC, other policies have been implemented
o increase vaccination rates in Guatemala: families do not pay to
ccess vaccination services and there have been efforts to ensure
hat vaccines are always available13. As a result, vaccination rates
ave increased dramatically in the last 20 years. For instance, the
overage rate of the vaccine against tuberculosis increased from
2 percent in 1990 to 96 percent in 2010. For other vaccines, the
ncrease in coverage rates also ranges from 10 to 30 percentage
oints.
The bottom panel of Table 1 shows vaccination rates by vaccine.
he study sample has a coverage rate that is very similar to the
est of the country’s. Also, note that vaccine coverage falls with
ge from 97 percent for the earliest vaccine to 35 percent for the
atest vaccine. This lower coverage for later vaccines reduces the
robability of immunization14.
12 DellaVigna et al. (2012) show that residents of suburban Chicago donate to char-
table causes in response to social pressure (they estimate the average cost of saying
o  to a solicitor at $3.80 for an in-state charity). Community health workers may  be
ble to exert similar social pressure.
13 There are also vaccination campaigns that typically target adult populations
r  promote new vaccines. For instance, in 2010 there was a campaign to vacci-
ate for the inﬂuenza virus (H1N1), and in 2012 a campaign to vaccinate for the
neumococcus virus. Both campaigns were aimed at the adult population.
14 The reasons for multiple doses/boosters of a vaccine vary by type of vaccine.
n the one hand, live attenuated vaccines (e.g., MMR)  are weakened live viruses or
acteria that can replicate. They can easily be rendered ineffective by heat or light.
o  increase the chances of immunity these types of vaccines require multiple doses.onomics 44 (2015) 226–237 229
For this population, these patterns seem to rule out two poten-
tial explanations for low coverage for later vaccines: a general
objection to vaccination and a lack of access. More likely explana-
tions may  include poor follow-through due to lack of information,
or lower motivation to obtain the later vaccines, which families
may  perceive as less important. An alternative explanation is that
younger children require more frequent visits to the clinics than
older children, providing more opportunities for vaccination. For
example, young children may be brought to the clinic to be weighed
and measured, services that may  not be received at later ages.
Hence, for older children the full marginal cost of the visit may
be attributed to the vaccine15.
Household survey data also reveal that low demand for vaccines
for older children does not appear to be due to a lack of access to
the vaccines. When asked about their last visit to the clinics being
studied, the average family traveled less than 1 km to get to the
clinic; only ﬁve percent of those surveyed traveled more than 3 km,
or for more than 40 minutes. Generally, when families go to a clinic
they receive care from a doctor or nurse (91 percent), and are seen
within an hour (83 percent). Of those that went to a clinic in need
of curative care, fewer than 2 percent had to pay for care during
their last visit16.
3. Experiment
This section proceeds as follows. First, we describe the inter-
vention. Second, we  provide details about the experimental design.
Third, we  describe the data sources. Fourth, we analyze the sample
used in the analysis and discuss issues of external validity. Fifth, we
show that the distribution of observable characteristics is similar
between treatment and control groups. Finally, we discuss compli-
ance with treatment assignment.
3.1. Intervention
This study evaluates an intervention that utilizes the PEC’s
administrative records to generate lists of patients that were due
for preventive health services. The lists include detailed informa-
tion identifying individuals who  need a service and the type of
service needed (on a monthly basis). These lists enable community
health workers to give speciﬁc and timely individual reminders
to families. The lists group patients by neighborhood, then house-
holds, while services are grouped by type. A typical list might
include 20 homes and 30 individual patients due for 90 services,On  the other hand, inactivated vaccines are not alive and therefore cannot replicate.
Inactivated vaccines (e.g., polio, DPT Pentavalent) always require multiple doses.
In general, the ﬁrst dose primes the immune system without providing immunity.
A  protective immune response develops only after the second or third dose. As a
result, immunity requires several doses of these vaccines (Liko et al., 2014).
15 A related issue is whether the presence of siblings may affect the marginal costs
of  vaccination for older children. That is, if a mother has to take an infant to a health
clinic, the marginal cost of having an older child vaccinated is reduced. We explored
this possibility empirically by checking whether complete vaccination rates differed
between children older than 18 months with siblings younger than a year old and
children of the same age without younger siblings. We did not ﬁnd evidence that
the  presence of an infant affected completion rates among older children. How-
ever, these results are based on a subset of the sample of children included in our
household survey, which is a much smaller sample than we use for our main analysis.
16 The Online Appendix provides secondary results for this paper. Appendix Table
1  presents a set of statistics that characterize the access to and use of health services
by households in our sample. Appendix Table 2 presents a set of scales that measure
attitudes towards vaccination in these populations.
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records19. Above all, the basic motivation for the study was  to
test a method to ensure that children receiving initial vaccinations
follow through with later scheduled vaccinations. For this reason,30 M. Busso et al. / Journal of He
linic. In contrast, community health workers in the control group
linics had to attempt to track patients in their coverage area on
heir own, if they chose to do so at all. While health workers in all
EC communities are expected to provide some kind of reminder,
ealth workers in treatment communities received concise, up-
o-date information on which families to remind, whereas health
orkers in control communities had to rely on their own records,
hich they may  or may  not have created and maintained.
Communities served by the PEC can receive medical services
ocally only on the date of the mobile medical team’s monthly visit.
herefore, community health workers’ reminders play an impor-
ant role in receiving health care. The reminders could increase
emand for preventive health services by helping patients not to
orget to take their children to health clinics to receive these ser-
ices. Alternatively, the reminders could highlight the importance
f receiving vaccines according to the recommended schedule and,
ence, they could be seen as providing information about their
alue in a more indirect way.
To implement the intervention, a software developer wrote a
rogram that produces the patient lists. Additional staff was hired
o produce the lists every month in each of four study areas for the
linics that were randomly assigned to the treatment group. These
our staff members were aware of the study’s experimental design
nd understood that they should not distribute the lists to clinics
ssigned to the control group. At the community health workers’
onthly meetings at the NGO ofﬁces, list facilitators distributed
he lists with information on individuals in their communities that
eeded health services that month and the following month to the
reatment group. Community health workers in the control group
ere aware of the study and may  have observed the lists being dis-
ributed to health workers in the treatment group. If this fact made
ealth workers in the control group increase their efforts to track
atients in their coverage areas, this would lead to underestimating
he treatment effects of this study.
.2. Experimental design
A randomized controlled trial was implemented to evaluate the
ffects of the intervention on children’s vaccination coverage rates.
he main outcome of interest is an indicator variable equal to one if
 child has completed all vaccines recommended for her age. Treat-
ent was randomly assigned at the clinic level within strata (there
ere 167 clinics that were randomized). These strata were con-
tructed by interacting the jurisdiction, a geographic grouping of
linics, and community health workers’ use of any type of patient
ists at baseline. There were 27 strata generated from the 15 juris-
ictions. The total number of strata is not 30 because in three
urisdictions either all or none of the community health workers
ere using patient lists at baseline. At clinics assigned to the treat-
ent group, community health workers received patient lists; at
linics assigned to the control group, there was no intervention and
ommunity health workers were expected to continue conducting
utreach using their own records (if they had any).
We  worked closely with the NGOs to ensure that they under-
tood and were willing to execute the experimental design. This
as manageable due to the small number of NGOs. PEC authori-
ies recommended NGOs that had average baseline coverage rates,
xcluding NGOs with exceptional or very poor performance. Three
GOs operating in four areas of the country (Sacatepéquez, Chi-
altenango, El Estor and Morales) were selected for the study17.
17 Las Misioneras del Sagrado Corazón de Jesús works in Sacatepéquez, a depart-
ent that borders the department of Guatemala, which includes the capital,
uatemala City. The Asociación Xilotepeq operates in Chimaltenango, a predom-
nantly rural department, despite also bordering the jurisdiction of Guatemala.onomics 44 (2015) 226–237
It is important to mention that working with only three NGOs
might limit the external validity of the study if these NGOs had
some peculiar characteristics that made them more or less effec-
tive than the average NGO operating in the PEC. Unfortunately, we
lack information on the characteristics of the participating NGOs
and non-participating NGOs that would enable us to validate the
PEC’s staff assessment of these NGOs as “typical.”
From April to June 2011 we collected baseline data on commu-
nity health workers and trained them on the use the patients’ lists.
We  distributed patients’ lists to the community health workers
between August 2011 and January 2012. That is, the interven-
tion lasted six months. In February 2012, we collected endline
information, which included extracting administrative records and
surveying households and community health workers.
3.3. Data
The PEC’s electronic medical record system is the main source
of data used in this study. Recorded information includes the birth
date of the child and dates of services she has received from the
program. This data source should include all children under ﬁve
years old living in the communities covered by the program. The
NGOs maintain and update these administrative records as part
of their regular activities18. The use of administrative records to
assess effects on vaccination rates allows us to detect small effects
because of the large sample size involved. However, it is possible
that certain limitations regarding the completeness and quality of
the data might affect the results.
Regarding completeness, according to former program ofﬁcials
and individuals well acquainted with the program, the adminis-
trative records include the vast majority of children in the covered
communities. However, we  lack objective data to substantiate
these claims. If the administrative records do not include infor-
mation on all children living in the community at a certain point,
estimated effects would only be valid for children who are listed in
the administrative records. Ideally, collecting baseline data for all
children in the communities participating in the study would have
provided relevant information in regards to this issue. However,
because of funding limitations, we  did not collect such data.
Still, we do not believe that this compromises the study for the
following reasons. First, because the PEC focuses on the provision
of maternal and child health services, a core responsibility of
the community health workers network is identifying pregnant
women and newborns in the community. Similarly, community
health workers are expected to monitor migration and death of
beneﬁciaries to keep records updated. Second, PEC staff conduct
a census in all the communities they cover each year to ensure
that administrative records are up to date. Third, because certain
preventive health services such as ﬁrst-dose polio vaccination
have very high rates of coverage, and the PEC is the main provider
of these services, we can expect that the vast majority of children
in the community will receive at least some services from the PEC.
Consequently, they will be included in the PEC’s administrativeFinally, Proyecto San Francisco works in El Estor and Morales, two distinct areas
of  the department of Izabal, which is on Guatemala’s Caribbean coast. El Estor and
Morales are both very rural, and El Estor has a predominantly indigenous population.
18 The system was  implemented in 2007 and as part of the initial implementation,
(electronic) vaccination records were updated for children living in communities
covered by the PEC.
19 According to former program ofﬁcials, the PEC is the main provider of preventive
health services to children in the communities covered, due to the signiﬁcant dis-
tance involved and poor transportation methods available to reach other providers.
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nalyzing effects on children listed in the administrative records
oes not seem to be a major limitation20.
The second potential limitation of using administrative records
elates to the quality of vaccination data. If vaccines are provided at
ther clinics, they may  not be documented in the electronic records.
owever, in the communities being studied the vast majority of
reventive health services are provided by the PEC. In addition,
EC doctors routinely check children’s vaccination cards and add
his information to patient charts. Still, because data on new vac-
ines provided are recorded on paper charts by the mobile medical
eam as services are rendered, and these charts are used by data
ntry staff at the NGOs’ ofﬁces to update electronic medical records,
t is possible that errors occur during the data capture process21.
e empirically investigated the quality of the vaccination data by
omparing administrative records against the (independent) infor-
ation contained in the children’s vaccination cards (which we
ollected in household surveys). On average and for all vaccines,
esults show a high degree of correspondence: in 85 percent of
ases the vaccination proﬁle from administrative sources matched
he information on the vaccination card22.
In addition to administrative data, we collected survey data
rom all community health workers. Baseline and endline surveys
ncluded questions on health workers’ basic demographic charac-
eristics, their years of experience with the PEC, their work habits,
nd how they managed information. These surveys were com-
leted during the regular monthly meetings taking place at the
GO ofﬁces. At baseline, 203 health workers from 167 clinics par-
icipated (at least one worker per clinic). At endline, a total of 218
ommunity health workers working in 142 clinics participated in
he survey. Both the expansion in the number of workers and the
ttrition in the number of clinics are not correlated with treatment
tatus23.
Finally, we collected household survey data to characterize
he underlying context of the intervention. Using administrative
ecords extracted in November 2011, we identiﬁed the sample to
e surveyed, which included all households in the participating
20 An additional concern is whether the intervention could have affected enroll-
ent in the administrative records. Because of the nature of the intervention
generating reminders for parents of children already included in the administrative
ata set) we do not consider this to be likely. We  have checked if total enrollment is
ifferent across the treatment and control groups, and we  did not ﬁnd evidence
upporting this hypothesis. Moreover, if the intervention differentially affected
nrollment in the administrative records for certain groups, we  should expect that
he treatment and control groups should not be balanced at endline. But the avail-
ble evidence suggests that these groups were balanced. Finally, results from Table 1
uggest similar patterns of vaccination coverage between the communities partici-
ating in the study (computed using data from the administrative records) and the
ural population of Guatemala (computed using data from representative household
urveys). This provides additional evidence in favor of the external validity of the
esults.
21 Another potential discrepancy arises if there are extensive vaccination cam-
aigns and the related vaccines provided are not updated in the administrative
ecords. In Guatemala vaccination campaigns take place twice a year. In rural areas
EC  staff is enlisted to collaborate with these campaigns. Hence, we  expect that the
otential vaccines provided as a result of the campaigns would be included in the
dministrative records. Moreover, because the PEC is focused on preventive health
are services and because the regular schedule of visits to communities and activ-
ties during the visits remains unaltered, these vaccination campaigns do not play
 major role in the actual provision of services in the communities covered by the
rogram.
22 We provide evidence on the accuracy of records by vaccine in Appendix
able 3.
23 See Appendix Table 4. Also note that, for the purpose of treatment effect esti-
ation, the information collected in the community health worker endline survey
s  only used to deal with imperfect compliance. Speciﬁcally, we compute an instru-
ental variable estimator (LATE) in which we instrument the actual use of the new
atient lists with the randomized treatment variable. We can still estimate an intent-
o-treat (ITT) estimate using all the clinics and results are unchanged. We  explore
his further in Section 5.onomics 44 (2015) 226–237 231
communities that had children in the administrative data who
were expected to be 6 to 8 months old or 18 to 20 months old at
endline. The purpose of focusing on families with children in these
two age ranges was to better understand the perspectives and
practices of families with infants versus those with older children.
For families interviewed, we  collected information on socio-
demographic characteristics, access to and use of health services in
general, access to and use of health services provided by the PEC,
and views regarding the beneﬁts and costs of child vaccination.
3.4. Sample
Initially, we  randomly assigned 167 clinics to the treatment and
control groups. Two  restrictions reduced the number of communi-
ties included in the analysis. First, we dropped 12 clinics because
administrative records at endline could not be extracted from them
due to software-related issues24. Second, we  dropped 25 clinics for
which we did not have community health workers’ endline data.
Hence, the ﬁnal sample includes 130 clinics in roughly the same
number of communities25. The main vaccination sample includes
all children aged 10 to 59 months at endline (February 2012) who,
according to administrative records, were living in the communi-
ties. This sample is used to estimate vaccination effects at endline
and also to assess balance at baseline (in April 2011, when the
children were aged 0 to 49 months)26, 27.
Even though it is possible that these sample restrictions some-
what limit the external validity of the results, we do not think that
is the case here. Observable characteristics of households and mean
immunization rates by vaccines are very similar between the unre-
stricted and the restricted sample suggesting that the probability
of being excluded from the estimating sample is not related to the
outcome of interest28.
3.5. Balance
The randomization was successful in that the clinics in the
treatment and control groups are similar in terms of observable
characteristics. Table 2 documents that both groups are well bal-
anced in terms of clinic, community health worker and household
characteristics. Importantly, child indicators for complete vac-
cination and individual vaccines are well balance between the
treatment and control groups. In addition, we  have checked bal-
ance in about 60 variables and found only one indicator that was
statistically signiﬁcantly different at the 10 percent level (complete
vaccination in the area of Sacatepéquez, which was higher in the
control group)29.
3.6. Compliance
We hired one additional staff member per NGO to implement
the project at each of the NGO ofﬁces, in part, to ensure that the
random assignment to treatment was followed. We  also hired a
Guatemalan pediatrician as a local supervisor for the entire project.
The additional staff hired to implement the project at the NGOs
24 Eleven of these communities are in the department of Sacatepéquez and one in
Chimaltenango.
25 Appendix Table 5 shows sample sizes of these data sources.
26 As mentioned, we extracted vaccination records data on February 2012, imme-
diately following the intervention. Because records include information on whether
and when a vaccine was provided, it is possible to reconstruct vaccination rates at
an earlier date.
27 Appendix Table 6 shows how the sample size changes as we impose these
sample restrictions.
28 Appendix Table 7 presents these results.
29 These results are presented in Appendix Table 8.
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Table 2
Balance.
Mean control Mean treatment Diff. p-Value Obs.
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Clinic characteristics
Children in administrative records 112.1 121.2 8.98 0.520 130
Community health worker working at clinic 1.200 1.185 −0.015 0.914 130
Days  per month the mobile medical team is at the clinic 1.323 1.385 0.062 0.635 130
Distance to closest health center (km) 14.63 18.91 4.277 0.165 130
Community health worker characteristics
Educational attainment–primary school 0.500 0.610 0.110 0.144 155
Educational attainment–lower secondary 0.282 0.195 −0.087 0.175 155
Years  of experience with the PEC 5.159 5.123 −0.036 0.950 155
Received list including children needing vaccines 0.423 0.429 0.005 0.958 155
Household characteristics
Number of children under 5 years 1.655 1.628 −0.027 0.652 1190
Distance to clinic (minutes) 15.97 15.30 −0.668 0.718 1134
Mother’s education (years) 3.785 3.802 0.017 0.975 1145
House has dirt ﬂoor 0.510 0.593 0.083 0.250 1190
Child  characteristics
Complete vaccination 0.680 0.681 0.001 0.975 12956
Tuberculosis 0.953 0.954 0.001 0.912 12956
Pentavalent 1 0.915 0.924 0.009 0.396 12491
Polio  1 0.916 0.925 0.009 0.394 12491
Pentavalent 2 0.885 0.890 0.005 0.717 11945
Polio  2 0.884 0.890 0.005 0.699 11945
Pentavalent 3 0.873 0.873 −0.001 0.970 11354
Polio  3 0.874 0.873 −0.001 0.957 11354
MMR  0.698 0.698 0.000 0.988 12491
DPT  booster 1 0.742 0.757 0.014 0.642 8262
Polio  booster 1 0.739 0.756 0.016 0.599 8262
DPT  booster 2 0.195 0.190 −0.005 0.916 348
Polio  booster 2 0.201 0.190 −0.011 0.831 348
Notes: Indicators for clinic and community health worker characteristics are constructed using data from the community health workers baseline survey. Indicators for
household characteristics are constructed from the household survey. Vaccination rates are computed using administrative data. The clinic sample is restricted to those with
data  from the community health worker endline survey and from administrative records. The child sample for individual vaccines is restricted to children with the minimum
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nd  younger at baseline are included. In results not shown we  test balance in the p
e  only reject the null hypothesis for the variable “house has dirt ﬂoor”, at the 5% 
as accountable to this local project supervisor, whose interest
as ensuring that the study design was carried out accurately. In
he absence of concern over compliance with treatment, existing
GO staff could have absorbed the tasks involved in producing the
atients’ lists, as they required only about four hours per month.
While it was technically possible for list facilitators to generate
ists for clinics assigned to the control group, the project supervi-
or made it clear to them that they should only generate lists for
linics in the treatment group. This was also clear to NGO man-
gers, who were supportive of the experimental design. The local
roject supervisor visited each NGO ofﬁce and many of the clinics
umerous times during the intervention. In his visits to the NGO
fﬁces and when speaking with community health workers at the
linics, the project supervisor found no evidence that the patient
ists were being distributed to clinics in the control group, or that
he lists were not being distributed to community health workers
n clinics assigned to the treatment group.
Nonetheless, community health workers’ survey responses at
ndline suggest that not all of those workers in the treatment group
eceived the patients’ lists. This is shown in Table 3. On average, 64
ercent of community health workers from clinics assigned to the
reatment group (which represents 68 percent of children) indi-
ated that they received the new lists, compared to 14 percent
f community health workers from clinics assigned to the control
roup (16 percent of children). However, there is reason to believe
hat most of these health workers in the control group did not actu-
lly receive the lists, but were referring to some other type of list
hen answering the question. Of the 13 health workers who  indi-
ated that they did receive the lists, four indicated that they had
een receiving them for over 12 months; this was  not possible,onths and older at baseline are included. Moreover, only children aged 49 months
ed indicators using estimating Eq. (1) that conditions on strata indicator variables.
cance level. Standard errors are clustered at the clinic level.
however, because the lists had only been distributed for six months.
Another eight indicated that they had been receiving the lists for
one or two  months. While it also seems unlikely that they would
have received the lists, even if they had, they would have had them
for a short period of time. Only one health worker in the control
group indicates that he had received the lists for six months, the
duration of the treatment period.
4. Empirical strategy
Random assignment of treatment allows for a simple estimation
of treatment effects as follows:
yisc =  ˛ + Tsc + ˇXisc + s + εisc (1)
where yisc is the outcome for child i in clinic c of randomization stra-
tum s, Tsc represents the random treatment assignment for clinic c
of stratum s, s are strata ﬁxed effects, and εisc is the error term.
The main outcome of interest is whether the child has completed
all vaccinations required for his or her age. Because vaccination
depends crucially on age and vaccination history, the vector Xisc
includes indicator variables for the child’s age in months, and the
child’s baseline vaccination status (an indicator variable equal to
one if the child had all vaccinations recommended for her age
at baseline). We  estimate Eq. (1) by ordinary least squares. In all
regressions, we  estimate clustered standard errors at the clinic
level. Strata ﬁxed effects are included in all regressions as this has
been shown to improve statistical power (Bruhn and McKenzie,
2009).
Because the endline community health workers survey suggests
that not all workers in the treatment group received the patients’
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Table  3
Data management.
Mean control Mean treatment Diff. p-Value Obs.
[1]  [2] [3] [4] [5]
Community health worker responses (endline)
Received new lists—all 0.141 0.635 0.481*** 0.000 181
Received new lists—Chimaltenango 0.100 0.652 0.505*** 0.000 43
Received new lists—El Estor 0.208 0.625 0.389*** 0.003 48
Received new lists—Morales 0.136 0.875 0.731*** 0.000 46
Received new lists—Sacatepequez 0.105 0.400 0.283* 0.057 44
Kept  own  records of patient services 0.929 0.979 0.040 0.197 181
Knew  who needed services the following month 0.976 1.000 0.026* 0.090 181
Planned who to remind with a list 0.412 0.583 0.218*** 0.002 181
Reminded people of visit 0.988 0.990 0.001 0.964 181
Reminded speciﬁc people of visit 0.871 0.958 0.073* 0.054 181
Received any lists from mobile medical team 0.659 0.792 0.157*** 0.012 181
Received lists from mobile medical team, including:
Children to vaccinate 0.576 0.792 0.235*** 0.000 181
Children to weigh 0.565 0.604 0.061 0.344 181
Children needing micronutrients 0.282 0.469 0.183*** 0.004 181
Children needing deworming 0.365 0.583 0.238*** 0.001 181
Women needing prenatal checks 0.353 0.385 0.038 0.598 181
Women needing family planning 0.212 0.281 0.085 0.166 181
Women needing micronutrients 0.235 0.323 0.092 0.159 181
Women needing vaccines 0.294 0.385 0.102 0.138 181
Women needing postnatal checks 0.165 0.250 0.086 0.126 181
Hours  spent maintaining own records 8.410 10.415 2.177 0.439 177
Own  records included vaccine information 0.718 0.771 0.061 0.320 181
Household responses (endline)
Ever visited by community health worker 0.818 0.782 −0.034 0.359 1190
Visited by community health worker in previous month 0.768 0.797 0.035 0.243 919
Has  seen community health worker’s patient lists 0.156 0.210 0.039 0.312 950
Notes: Indicators for community health workers are constructed using data from the endline survey. Household indicators are constructed from the household survey. Strata
indicator variables are included in all regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the clinic level.
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ists, estimates of parameter  in Eq. (1) capture the intent to treat
ffect (ITT). Because we  are also interested in the average treatment
ffect, we also estimate the following equation using two-stage
east squares (2SLS):
isc =  ˛ + ıDsc + ˇXisc + s + εisc (2)
here participation, DSC, is deﬁned as whether or not the commu-
ity health worker received the patients’ lists, as indicated in the
ndline survey. We  use the clinics’ random assignment to treat-
ent TSC as an instrument for DSC. Randomization guarantees that
he instrument is exogenous. It is also strongly correlated with
articipation30. The parameter ı in Eq. (2) estimates the local aver-
ge treatment effect (LATE)31.
. Results
.1. Complete vaccination
Table 4 presents the main results of this study. The top panel
hows results for all the children in the sample. Column 1 shows the
ean and standard deviation of complete vaccination in the control
roup at endline. Columns 2 and 3 present the ITT estimates with
nd without control variables. Because vaccination depends on age
nd pre-treatment vaccination status, our preferred speciﬁcations
ontrol for these two set of variables. The treatment signiﬁcantly
ncreases children’s probability of having complete vaccination for
heir ages by 2.2 percentage points. The estimated ITT effect is
30 In Tables 4 and 5, we report in the notes the ﬁrst stage F-statistics. In all cases,
hese statistics are well above the usual threshold of 10.
31 See Angrist and Imbens (1994) for further details.positive but statistically insigniﬁcant when we do not condition
on control variables. The LATE estimate shows a stronger effect,
increasing the probability of complete vaccination by 4.5 percent-
age points (Column 4). Again, results are positive but statistically
insigniﬁcant when we  do not include control variables (Column 5).
Not all children in the sample were due for a vaccine during the
intervention period and hence, not all of them were expected to
be reminded. For example, the parents of a child aged 30 months
at endline should have not been reminded. This is due to the fact
that the intervention lasted 6 months and vaccines are due when
children are born and then when they turn 2, 4, 6, 12, 18 and 48
months old. In contrast, the parents of a child aged 20 months old
at endline should have been reminded about the vaccine due at
18 months of age. Hence, we  can classify children in two  groups.
The ﬁrst group includes children whose parents were expected to
be reminded during the intervention (those aged 10–23 and 48–53
months at endline) and the second group includes those whose
parents were not expected to be reminded (those aged 24–47 and
54–58 months). The intervention should directly affect children in
the ﬁrst group but not those in the second group. However, it is the-
oretically possible that the intervention could also affect children in
the second group. For example, there could be positive spillovers on
children in the second group through siblings or neighbors. Also, if
the intervention induces community health workers to target their
efforts in children in the ﬁrst group (those to be reminded), there
could be negative effects on children in the second group.
To explore this issue empirically, the second panel of Table 4
presents separate estimates for these two groups of children.
For children whose parents were expected to be reminded,
results indicate positive and signiﬁcant effects that are robust
across speciﬁcations. The ITT estimated effects are 4.1 to 4.6
percentage points and the LATE estimated effects are 8.1 to
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Table 4
Treatment effect on complete vaccination.
Mean and SD control at endline ITT (SE) ITT (SE) LATE (SE) LATE (SE) Obs.
[1]  [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Full sample 0.602 (0.490) 0.022** (0.011) 0.015 (0.014) 0.045* (0.023) 0.029 (0.028) 12956
Sample  of:
Children reminded
(10–23 and 48–53
months old)
0.494 (0.500) 0.046** (0.019) 0.041* (0.022) 0.091** (0.041) 0.081* (0.046) 5358
Children  not
reminded (24–47 and
54–59 months old)
0.675 (0.469) 0.001 (0.009) −0.001 (0.013) 0.002 (0.018) −0.002 (0.026) 7598
Control  variables Yes No Yes No
Notes: In columns 2 and 4 results are estimated controlling for strata indicator variables, pretreatment status and dummies representing children’s age in months. In columns
3  and 5 results are estimated including as controls only strata indicator variables. In columns 4 and 5 (LATE), participation is deﬁned as whether community health workers
indicated in the endline survey that they received the new patient lists. The ﬁrst stage F-statistic ranges from 43.99 to 44.65 across models and samples. Standard errors are
clustered at the clinic level.
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ing that they are not receiving patients’ lists). This is because those
health workers provided implausible answers to questions regard-
ing the patients’ lists: most said they had been receiving the lists
33* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.5.
** p < 0.01.
.1 percentage points. In contrast, estimated effects for children
f parents not expected to be reminded are essentially zero sug-
esting that the intervention did not generate spillovers for these
hildren32.
Table 5 shows treatment effects for each vaccine. The depen-
ent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the child has
eceived each vaccine. In Columns (1) to (4) the sample includes all
hildren with at least the minimum age to receive the vaccine. This
eans, for instance, that all children in the sample are included in
he estimated effect of the intervention on the tuberculosis vaccine
a vaccine administered at birth), but we only include children who
re at least 12 months of age in the estimated effect on the MMR
accine, which is due at 12 months. We  expect to ﬁnd much smaller
ffects for earlier vaccines that have much higher baseline cover-
ge rates. In general, we do not reject the null of no treatment effect
or most vaccines although point estimates are larger for booster
accines due at 48 months. In Columns (5) through (8), we restrict
he sample to those children who were due for each vaccine dur-
ng the intervention period and, therefore, whose parents should
ave been reminded about that deadline. Consistent with the main
esults presented in Table 4, we ﬁnd larger treatment effects for
his subsample.
.2. Heterogeneity
Table 6 analyzes whether effects are heterogeneous by char-
cteristics of the child, the community health worker or the area
he serves. We  start by exploring heterogeneous effects across chil-
ren in different age groups. As noted, the age of the child directly
ffects whether her parents were expected to be reminded. Here we
rovide a more detailed analysis of this issue by exploring differ-
ntial effects across four groups of children deﬁned based on their
ge in months at endline: 10–23, 24–47, 48–53 and 54–58. Results
ndicate positive and similar effects for children in the two  groups
hat included those expected to be reminded (those aged 10–23
nd 48–53 months). In contrast, estimated effects for children
ot expected to be reminded are close to zero (those aged 24–47
nd 54–58 months). These results suggest that the documented
ifferential effects across age groups are due to the direct rela-
ionship between age and the expectation to be reminded rather
han to age per se. Finally, we report p-values of the Chow tests for
32 Also, the absence of effects on children whose parents were not expected to be
eminded could be interpreted as a placebo experiment giving more credibility to
he  results.signiﬁcant differences in coefﬁcients across subgroups. We reject
equality of effects across these four groups of children.
To divide the sample of communities according to their
household characteristics (e.g., household income), we computed
averages by community using data from the household surveys.
Effects are larger for health workers who  did not use patients’ lists
at baseline (panel 2) and slightly larger for more educated health
workers (panel 3). This suggests that the treatment effect is larger
for those workers who did not use lists previously and that once
they started receiving them, they were able to understand and
use the lists. Treatment effects are also larger for those commu-
nity health workers serving larger (panel 4) and poorer populations
(panel 5). In none of these cases, however, do we  have statistical
power to reject equality at the usual signiﬁcance levels33,34. Also,
there are some differential effects by area of study. In particular,
treatment effects are positive and signiﬁcant in Chimaltenango and
negative in Sacatepéquez. However, again, the Chow test of equality
of treatment effects across groups cannot be rejected (panel 6)35.
5.3. Robustness
Table 7 shows the results of several exercises that we  perform to
assess the robustness of the main estimated treatment effects. First,
we explore whether the results are driven by the decision of drop-
ping clinics from the main sample for which we  do not have endline
data on community health workers. To that end, we  estimate the ITT
effects on a sample that includes these clinics. Results, presented
in Table 7, indicate that the effects in this larger sample are similar
to those in the main estimation sample. These results also suggest
that the sample restrictions do not seem to jeopardize the external
validity of the results. Second, we  estimated Eq. (2) coding DSC = 0
for community health workers from the control group (i.e. assum-Appendix Table 9 shows other results regarding the heterogeneity of the treat-
ment effect (by population, education, household size, and distance to the clinic).
We  do not ﬁnd heterogeneous effects across these dimensions.
34 Many of these factors are highly correlated. Therefore, we interpret these ﬁnd-
ings with caution.
35 According to the project supervisor’s interviews with health workers, in
Sacatepéquez they were least likely to use the new lists and were the least enthusias-
tic  about the project. Note, however, that we  randomized within jurisdiction so each
jurisdiction within Sacatepéquez contains itself an experiment. Thus, confounders
should not affect treatment effect estimation in that area.
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Table  5
Treatment effect on individual vaccines.
Panel A: Full sample Panel B: Children reminded (10–23 and 48–53 months)
Minimum
age
Mean and
SD control
at endline
ITT (SE) LATE (SE) Obs. Mean and
SD control
at endline
ITT (SE) LATE (SE) Obs.
[1]  [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Tuberculosis Birth 0.957 (0.203) 0.004 (0.005) 0.008 (0.009) 15169 0.803 (0.398) 0.065** (0.030) 0.129** (0.058) 1279
Pentavalent 1 2 months 0.941 (0.236) −0.004 (0.004) −0.008 (0.008) 14891 0.763 (0.426) 0.005 (0.024) 0.011 (0.048) 1496
Polio  1 2 months 0.942 (0.233) −0.005 (0.004) −0.011 (0.008) 14891 0.769 (0.422) −0.005 (0.026) −0.011 (0.050) 1496
Pentavalent 2 4 months 0.907 (0.291) −0.004 (0.006) −0.007 (0.012) 14434 0.671 (0.470) −0.027 (0.029) −0.056 (0.059) 1478
Polio  2 4 months 0.906 (0.292) −0.004 (0.006) −0.008 (0.012) 14434 0.668 (0.471) −0.027 (0.029) −0.056 (0.060) 1478
Pentavalent 3 6 months 0.885 (0.318) −0.004 (0.007) −0.008 (0.015) 13890 0.616 (0.487) −0.001 (0.027) −0.001 (0.054) 1399
Polio  3 6 months 0.887 (0.317) −0.005 (0.007) −0.010 (0.014) 13890 0.618 (0.486) −0.004 (0.027) −0.009 (0.054) 1399
MMR  12 months 0.880 (0.325) 0.000 (0.008) 0.001 (0.016) 12491 0.689 (0.463) 0.034 (0.027) 0.066 (0.057) 1767
DPT  booster 1 18 months 0.732 (0.443) −0.001 (0.011) −0.003 (0.022) 10724 0.439 (0.497) 0.053* (0.028) 0.107* (0.058) 1374
Polio  booster 1 18 months 0.736 (0.441) −0.004 (0.011) −0.009 (0.022) 10724 0.452 (0.498) 0.038 (0.028) 0.077 (0.057) 1374
DPT  booster 2 48 months 0.412 (0.492) 0.019 (0.022) 0.038 (0.042) 2973 0.354 (0.478) 0.041 (0.030) 0.082 (0.061) 1752
Polio  booster 2 48 months 0.414 (0.493) 0.022 (0.022) 0.043 (0.042) 2973 0.357 (0.480) 0.040 (0.031) 0.081 (0.061) 1752
Notes: The dependent variables are indicator variables equal to one if the child has received each vaccine. The sample used for Panel A includes all children with at least
the  minimum age to receive each vaccine. The sample used for Panel B includes only the children who  reached the age when they should receive the vaccine during the
intervention period. For example, for DPT booster 1, in Panel B children aged 18 to 23 months old at endline are included because these children reached 18 months during the
intervention period and hence their parents should have been reminded to take their child to the clinic. For the LATE estimates, participation is deﬁned as whether community
health workers indicate in the endline survey that they received the new patients’ lists. All results are estimated controlling for strata indicator variables, pretreatment status
and  dummies for months of age of the children. Standard errors are clustered at the clinic level.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.5.
*** p < 0.01.
Table 6
Treatment effect on complete vaccination heterogeneous effects.
Mean and SD control at endline ITT (SE) LATE (SE) Obs.
[1]  [2] [3] [4]
1 Child age in months 10 to 23 (reminded) 0.568 (0.496) 0.041** (0.019) 0.081* (0.042) 3606
24  to 47 (not reminded) 0.718 (0.450) −0.000 (0.008) −0.000 (0.016) 6377
48  to 53 (reminded) 0.340 (0.474) 0.046* (0.026) 0.094* (0.051) 1752
54  to 59 (not reminded) 0.456 (0.498) −0.009 (0.021) −0.017 (0.039) 1221
Chow  test (p-value) 0.043 0.061
2 Community health worker
used lists at baseline
No 0.599 (0.490) 0.037** (0.016) 0.076** (0.039) 6123
Yes  0.604 (0.489) 0.004 (0.015) 0.007 (0.026) 6833
Chow  test (p-value) 0.129 0.140
3 Community health worker
with primary education or
more
No 0.660 (0.474) 0.016 (0.024) 0.027 (0.043) 3846
Yes  0.582 (0.493) 0.020* (0.011) 0.040* (0.022) 9110
Chow  test (p-value) 0.904 0.778
4 Population/number of
community health workers
Low 0.650 (0.477) 0.021 (0.019) 0.038 (0.036) 4435
High  0.572 (0.495) 0.030** (0.012) 0.064** (0.029) 8521
Chow  test (p-value) 0.696 0.572
5 Household income Poor 0.646 (0.478) 0.028 (0.019) 0.056 (0.043) 6500
Non-poor 0.565 (0.496) 0.002 (0.010) 0.004 (0.021) 6456
Chow  test (p-value) 0.219 0.282
6 Area Chimaltenango 0.563 (0.496) 0.052*** (0.014) 0.083*** (0.025) 2773
El  Estor 0.746 (0.435) 0.022 (0.025) 0.066 (0.087) 3787
Morales 0.583 (0.493) 0.028 (0.022) 0.042 (0.032) 3311
Sacatepequez 0.511 (0.500) −0.023 (0.016) −0.052 (0.037) 3085
Chow  test (p-value) 0.457 0.621
Notes: All results are estimated controlling for strata indicator variables, pretreatment status and dummies for months of age of the children. For the LATE estimates,
participation is deﬁned as whether community health workers indicate in the endline survey that they received the new patient lists. The “Chow test” row shows the p-value
of  a test of equality of treatment effect coefﬁcients across samples. The ﬁrst stage F-statistic ranges from 15.32 to 28.17 for all models excluding area regressions models. For
models  estimated by child age, F = 46.30 for 10 to 23 months, 42.51 for 24 to 47 months, 39.07 for 48 to 53 months and 44.13 for 54 to 59 months. For models estimated by
area,  F = 36.55 for Chimaltenango, 5.22 for El Estor, 18.29 for Morales and 6.41 for Sacatepéquez. Standard errors are clustered at the clinic level.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.5.
*** p < 0.01.
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Table 7
Treatment effect on complete vaccination robustness checks.
Panel A: Including 155 clinics Panel B: Main sample
ITT (SE) Obs. ITT (SE) Baseline LATE (SE) Alternative LATE (SE) Obs.
[1]  [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Full sample 0.021** (0.010) 14552 0.022** (0.011) 0.045* (0.023) 0.034** (0.016) 12956
Sample of:
Reminded children (10–23 and 48–53 months old) 0.036** (0.017) 6019 0.046** (0.019) 0.091** (0.041) 0.069** (0.028) 5358
Not  reminded children (24–47 and 54–59 months old) 0.004 (0.008) 8533 0.001 (0.009) 0.002 (0.018) 0.002 (0.013) 7598
Notes: All results are estimated controlling for strata indicator variables, pretreatment status and dummies for months of age of the children. The sample in Panel A includes
all  children aged 10 to 59 months old at endline irrespective of whether the community health worker completed the endline survey or not. Since this sample included 25
clinics  for which the community health workers did not complete the endline survey, it is not possible to deﬁne the participation dummy and, hence, LATE estimates cannot
be  calculated for this sample. In column 5 “Alternative LATE estimates” participation is deﬁned as whether community health workers indicate in the endline survey that
they  received the new patient lists but all community health workers in the control group were coded as non-participants. The ﬁrst stage F-statistic ranges from 117.37 to
126.30 across models and samples. Strata indicator variables are included in all regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the clinic level.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.5.
*** p < 0.01.
Table 8
Costs and cost-effectiveness estimates.
Panel A: Costs
NGO costs
Management $277.20
Training $247.44
Software and materials $104.73
Administrative staff $73.50
Total NGO costs $702.87
Children covered by NGO 6,310
NGO costs per child $0.11
Private costs per child $0.05
Total costs per child $0.17
Panel B: Cost-effectiveness
Impact on children with complete vaccination (ITT) 0.022
Cost per child with complete vaccination because of
intervention (ITT)
$7.53
Impact on children with complete vaccination (LATE) 0.045
Cost per child with complete vaccination because of
intervention (LATE)
$3.68
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eotes: All amounts are in 2013 dollars. Appendix 1 provides a description of the cost
ssumptions.
or longer than the lists had actually been distributed, and others
aid they had only received the lists in the last month. As expected,
he new LATE estimate is reduced slightly when compared to the
aseline LATE estimates.
.4. Cost and cost-effectiveness
The top panel in Table 8 presents estimates of the total costs
ncurred by implementing the intervention for six months36. These
osts include the additional NGO expenses needed to produce
nd distribute the patients’ lists. The bulk of these costs include
he management and training necessary to ensure that the inter-
ention was implemented adequately and that all relevant staff
NGO coordinators, community health workers and administrative
ersonnel in charge of producing the lists) were able to pro-
uce and use the newly generated patient lists effectively. NGO
xpenses also included the development and installation of add-
n software to produce the lists as well as materials needed to
36 See Appendix 1 for a detailed description of the assumptions involved in the
stimation of costs.produce them (paper, ink). Finally, the NGO costs also included
the time necessary for administrative staff to actually produce
the patient lists. We  estimate that the increase in costs for the
average NGO due to the implementation of the reminder inter-
vention during the six months period amounts to US$703 (in 2013
dollars).
Dividing this total cost by the number of children in the partic-
ipating communities, we  arrive at an estimated cost of US$0.11
per child. Note that this is the average cost per child covered
by the NGO. During the period studied, only some of these chil-
dren were due for a vaccine and, consequently, more likely might
have beneﬁted from a reminder to be brought to the health clinic.
Hence, an alternative approach would involve computing average
costs per reminded child. In either of the two options, computing
average costs for all children or for reminded children, it is impor-
tant to relate these costs to estimated effects consistently. That
is, if average costs are computed for all children, then vaccination
effects should be computed for all children. Similarly, if costs are
computed per reminded child, then vaccination effects should be
computed only when including reminded children. We  believe that
the approach of focusing on all children is more desirable because
it incorporates potential indirect effects that the intervention could
generate. For example, this approach incorporates potential spill-
overs on siblings or through social networks. It also incorporates
the cost of providing lists for some community health workers, who
may  not use them.
To provide a comprehensive assessment of costs incurred by
the intervention, we  also consider the private costs generated
by increased visits by mothers to the health clinic. Approximat-
ing these costs requires a number of assumptions regarding how
the intervention affected the number of visits to the clinic, the
time involved per visit, and the value of mothers’ additional time
devoted to taking their children to the health clinic. We  estimate
that the cost per child (again, for all children, not just reminded
children) amounts to US$0.05. This low cost is primarily due to
the intervention’s limited effect on the number of visits to the
health clinic for the average child. It also reﬂects the limited
monetary value of time for mothers in this context, who have
low levels of education and, hence, limited expected opportu-
nity costs for time in the labor market. Adding the increased
NGO costs of generating and distributing the lists to private costs,
we arrive at a total cost per child covered by the intervention
of US$0.17.Dividing the estimated cost per child (US$0.17) by the estimated
ITT effect on complete vaccination (0.022) we produce the esti-
mated cost per additional child generated by the intervention. This
cost-effectiveness ratio stands at about US$7.50. Using the LATE
alth Ec
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stimates, the cost-effectiveness ratio is reduced to about US$3.70.
owever, this cost-effectiveness ratio using the LATE estimates
hould be interpreted with caution because it implicitly assumes
hat larger effects than the ones documented can be achieved at
he same cost. Hence, the ITT cost-effectiveness-ratio seems more
ndicative of the realistic costs involved in increasing complete vac-
ination per child due to this intervention.
. Conclusion
A critical question in development economics is how to increase
emand for preventive health care services. This paper addresses
his question by investigating whether reminding parents about
pcoming due dates for vaccines for their children can produce
ncreases in vaccination rates. We  conducted a ﬁeld experiment in
uatemala and used administrative and survey data from 130 rural
ommunities to assess the effects of a reminder intervention after
ix months of implementation. Results indicate that the interven-
ion produced an increase of 2.2 percentage points in the likelihood
hat children from one to ﬁve years of age had complete vaccina-
ion given their age in treatment communities. As expected, effects
ere larger among children who were due for a vaccine during
he implementation period (4.6 percentage points). Because asso-
iated costs are low, the strategy seems highly cost-effective: the
ost per additional child with complete vaccination as a result of
he intervention is estimated at about US$7.50.
Despite this evidence on the promising role of reminders, they
re currently rarely used in developing countries. Hence, there is
n opportunity to expand the role of reminders to achieve further
ains in vaccination rates at a moderate cost. Moreover, reminders
ould potentially be used not only to increase vaccination levels, but
lso to spur demand of other preventive health care measures. For
xample, it is well documented that insecticide-treated bed nets
an substantially reduce child mortality in developing countries
here malaria is prevalent (Dupas, 2011). However, conventional
nsecticide-treated nets should be re-treated every 6 to 12 months
o maintain full efﬁcacy and long-lasting insecticide-treated nets
hould be replaced every three to ﬁve years (Pulkki-Brännström
t al., 2012). Hence, reminding individuals when bed nets should
e treated or replaced can be an inexpensive strategy to increase
verall efﬁcacy of malaria-prevention measures.
Still, further research about how best to use reminders in devel-
ping countries is needed. Important questions remain regarding
ifferent aspects of the use of reminders. A ﬁrst set of questions
elates to the mode of communication to reach individuals (e.g.,
ext messages, cell-phone calls or in-person communication). A
econd set of questions relates to the value of using reminders
or upcoming due dates for certain services or contacting indi-
iduals for over-due services. Finally, more sophisticated systems
ould combine different types of reminder methods to maximize
overage levels of certain services at the lowest cost. For exam-
le, the most inexpensive types of reminders (e.g., automated text
essages) could be used ﬁrst, and then more expensive types of
eminders (e.g., cell-phone calls or in-person visits) could be used
ater to encourage parents of children who were not taken to the
linics for the promoted behavior. Providing a better understand-
ng about the effects and costs of alternative methods for different
ealth services could yield valuable evidence to inform policymak-
ng in this area.
ppendix A. Supplementary dataSupplementary data associated with this article can be found, in
he online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2015.08.
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